Real without being concrete: the ontology of public concern and its significance for the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) by Fellenor, Lindsay et al.
        
Citation for published version:
Fellenor, L, Barnett, J, Potter, C, Urquhart, J, Mumford, JD & Quine, CP 2018, 'Real without being concrete: the
ontology of public concern and its significance for the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF)', Journal of
Risk Research. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2018.1501598
DOI:
10.1080/13669877.2018.1501598
Publication date:
2018
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Fellenor, J et al., 2018. ‘Real without being concrete’:
the ontology of public concern and its significance for the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF).
Journal of Risk Research.  , which has been published in final form at
https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2018.1501598 . This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in
accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Jun. 2020
1 | P a g e  
 
 
“Real without being concrete”: the ontology of public concern and its significance for the 
Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) 
 
1 Dr John Fellenor (corresponding author; ljf38@bath.ac.uk +44 (0)1225 383788)a 
2 Prof. Julie Barnett (j.c.barnett@bath.ac.uk +44 (0)1225 383167)a 
3 Prof. Clive Potter (c.potter@imperial.ac.uk +44 (0)20 7594 9314)b 
4 Dr Julie Urquhart (jurquhart1@glos.ac.uk +44 (0)1242 715377)c 
5 Prof. J D Mumford (j.mumford@imperial.ac.uk +44 (0)20 7594 2206)b 
6 Prof. C P Quine (Chris.Quine@forestry.gsi.gov.uk +44 (0)300 067 5900)d 
 
a Department of Psychology, University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath , United Kingdom 
b Centre for Environmental Policy, Faculty of Natural Sciences, Imperial College London,  
  Princes Gardens, South Kensington, London, United Kingdom 
c Countryside and Community Research Institute, University of Gloucestershire, Gloucester, United  
   Kingdom 
d Forest Research, Northern Research Station, Roslin, Scotland 
 
 
 
AUTHOR COPY. NOT FOR REPRODUCTION OR CITATION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 | P a g e  
 
Abstract 
Public concern is a pivotal notion in the risk perception, communication and management 
literature. It is, for example, a central concept with regard to the social amplification of risk, 
and as a justification for policy attention. Despite its ubiquity, the notion of public concern 
remains a ‘black box’ presenting a poorly understood state of affairs as a reified matter-of-fact. 
Paying attention to the deployment and metrics of public concern, and the work it is required 
to do, will enhance the power of approaches to understanding risk, and policymaking. Thus, 
the broad purpose of this paper is to unpack the notion of public concern by adopting an 
ontological yet critical perspective; drawing on a range of literature, that considers ontology. 
We reflect on how publics and public concern have been conceptualised with regard to the 
dichotomies of individual/social and private/public, given that they imply different levels and 
dimensions of concern. We draw on empirical work that illuminates the assessment and 
measurement of public concern and how the public have responded to risk events. Considering 
public concern through an ontological lens affords a means of drawing renewed critical 
attention to objects that might otherwise appear finished or ready-made. 
 
Key words: ontology, public concern, Social Amplification of Risk Framework, assemblage, 
publics 
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Introduction 
The ubiquitous notion of public concern, and its relation to risk, the media and policy 
Public concern is a key concept regularly deployed across a wide range of academic, media 
and policy contexts. The concept can be mobilised in both explanatory and descriptive modes, 
e.g. as an effect of risk events, subsequently used to explain policy attention (Smith and 
McCloskey 1998), or as a prosaic description of how people may orientate to an issue. The 
rhetorical flexibility of ‘public concern’ establishes its centrality in both the media and in the 
policy making process (Gottweis 2007), as a motif or recurring element in the narratives used 
to make sense of the world. As such, it is important to consider the mode in which notions of 
public concern are mobilised, and the empirical basis for doing so.  
However, and more often than not, that there is a concerned public is assumed rather than 
established empirically. This is especially true of the media, where concern is regularly 
attributed to the public, or indeed inculcated, with regard disparate issues and as a matter of 
course.  For example, media coverage of a potential avian influenza pandemic in Greece in 
2005 resulted in over one million vaccines sales (Falagas and Kiriaze 2006). Within this figure 
there will of course exist heterogeneity with regard the make-up of groups and types of 
individual purchasing vaccines. Nonetheless, general public awareness of the influenza did not 
exist until the media created the perception of a risk. Hence, it can be suggested that the media 
not only ‘creates’ a [concerned] public, but also proxies of concern, e.g. vaccine sales, or 
significant increases in emergency department attendance, independent of actual disease 
prevalence within a community (McDonnell et al. 2012).In  other topics that garner media 
attention, such as climate change, variation in public concern levels has also been explained in 
terms of the nature of media coverage about it (Painter and Gavin 2016).  
More pertinently, policy makers erroneously take media coverage of risk events as indicative 
of public concern (Bakir 2006). Hence, identifying valid indicators of concern should be a 
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routinised aspect of policy development. Public concern often becomes ‘translated’ into 
regulatory changes attempting to prevent a problem recurring (Smith and McCloskey 1998). 
In this sense, ‘public concern’ has symbolic meaning beyond any particular referent, serving 
rather to organise and connect different levels and domains of effect. For example, abstract 
public concern about commercial fishing and its environmental effects may manifest as social 
changes to consumption practices, reflecting ethical issues of human relations with the 
environment. These changes may intersect with policy constraints on catch size and be of 
concern to individual fishermen, and in a way that differs from non-fisherman. Concern around 
contaminants in fish introduces an explicit relation with the domain of health.  
Risk management is therefore complex and necessitates policies that seek to reconcile harm 
minimisation with balancing the interests and responses of different individuals and publics 
(Hooker et al. 2017). It is thus important to recognise that any single concern issue involves 
and affects different publics in different ways with different aspects of the issue becoming more 
or less salient across time; high unemployment rates, for example, during recessions, ‘crowd 
out’ concern for the environment (Kahn and Kotchen 2010). Hence, concerns about an issue 
are not absolute, but exist in tension, overlapping and reinforcing each other, and giving rise to 
further concerns connected to yet more domains whilst existing concerns diminish. In this 
sense, situations that give rise to concern are not necessarily self-evident but are constituted by 
the actors involved in them, including policymakers (Grint 2005).  
The Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) and public concern 
With regard the risk literature per se, the relationship between public concern and the media is 
central to explanatory models, such as the social amplification of risk framework (SARF) 
(Kasperson et al 1988). According to SARF, risks pertaining to a risk ‘event’ or hazard are 
symbolised, processed and represented by various individual and social ‘amplification 
stations’, including the media (Kasperson et al. 1988). Amplification stations intensify or 
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attenuate public perceptions of risk, resulting in ‘ripple effects’ which may have far-reaching 
impacts beyond the risk event itself. The media, key players in relaying information to the 
public, are therefore implicated in the risk representations the public hold and the behaviours 
they display. However, whilst bringing risk issues to public awareness, the complexity of risk 
is usually oversimplified, if not misrepresented (Smith and McCloskey 1998). For example, 
media amplification of a now debunked study into the link between autism and the measles, 
mumps and rubella vaccine resulted in a substantial and persistent decline in vaccine coverage 
(Larson et al. 2013).  
Despite its heterogeneity, public concern is often presented as a homogeneous object with no 
ostensible context-dependent variation or complexity (Fellenor et al. under review-b). We 
suggest that within SARF, the notion of public concern is poorly characterised and that because 
policy makers invoke and do things with public concern, its heterogeneity in terms of material 
actors, affects, cognitions and other virtual1 objects requires greater consideration. Thus, 
despite the inherent relationality that SARF is predicated on, between individual and social 
amplification stations, risk events and so forth, it over simplifies the complexity of relations 
(Pidgeon and Barnett 2013); its analytical repertoire is insufficiently attuned to the 
heterogeneity and complexity of public concern. Nonetheless, because of its uniqueness in 
seeking to integrate social and psychological responses, SARF provides a starting point for 
contextualising and excavating the concept of public concern. 
Thus, the broad purpose of this paper is to unpack the notion of public concern. We pay 
particular regard to its role within SARF; an influential heuristic approach that explores the 
relationship between individual and social factors, including governmental and media 
                                                          
1 For our purpose, the virtual is an aspect of reality that can have an actual effect without any necessary 
materialisation, such as an obsession leading to compulsive behaviour. Against the virtual, the ‘actual’ refers to 
that which has concrete existence or has been realised as an effect (Deleuze and Guattari (2005  (Deleuze and 
Parnet 2007) 
6 | P a g e  
 
institutions, and predicated on the importance of understanding discrepancies between expert 
and lay assessments of risk. 
Aims 
Despite its ubiquity the notion of public concern remains a ‘black box’ (Woolgar and Lezaun 
2013); a poorly characterised state of affairs presented as a reified matter of fact (Yonay 1994). 
Paying attention to the metrics of public concern and the work it is required to do, will enhance 
the power of approaches such as SARF to understanding risk.  
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, to reflect on how publics and public concern have 
been conceptualised with regard to the relationship between ‘individual’ and ‘social’, and 
‘private’ and ‘public’, given the implication of different levels and dimensions of concern. In 
doing so, we draw on empirical work that illuminates how public concern has been assessed 
and how the public have responded to risk events. Secondly, we adopt an explicitly ontological 
perspective to afford public concern, an object that otherwise appears ‘‘finished” or “ready-
made”, the critical attention that the concept warrants.  
That there are publics and that they have concerns goes unquestioned. Yet within this common 
sense notion lies a conflation of the meanings of concern and the objects it is entangled with. 
We are therefore dealing with questions about the ontological relations between things. For 
example, how public concern as a social object relates to concern at an individual level, and 
how ‘something’ that inheres in a private realm of experience becomes a socio-political macro 
object that incorporates materiality. Addressing these questions will assist in exploring the 
extent to which we can differentiate individual concern from public concern and help us 
understand public concern’s constitutive power. 
The research questions addressed are: 
1. What is problematic about the notion of public concern? 
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2. What does empirical work that has focussed on public concern reveal? 
3. What does public concern look like through an ontological lens, and can this enhance 
our understanding of SARF? 
The problematic that is public concern 
The ontology of public concern: what is ‘real’?  
Ontology is the study of ‘what there is’; a consideration of what is ‘real’, what can be said to 
‘exist’ and what constitutes ‘being’. A further aspect involves how we categorise ‘things’ and 
draw conclusions about their characteristics. Implicit in the notion of ontology is a concern 
with the nature of the procedures and methods by which we address these questions (Hay 2006). 
The most important explanatory task for ontology is to reflect on the relations between things 
and whether they are fundamental entities or dependent on other entities for their existence 
(Berto and Plebani 2015). Given that in the case of ‘public’, ‘individual’ and ‘concern’, we are 
dealing with the nature of political reality (Hay 2002), adopting an ontological viewpoint is a 
fundamental step in establishing our knowledge about these objects and the methods we 
employ to do so (Hay 2007).  
How have ‘publics’ been theorised?  
‘Public’ is a conceptually problematic term (Hallahan 2000) comprising ideological, 
descriptive, and normative associations. The ideological element implies that the public, and 
what is for the public good, rests on an imaginary uniformity and consensus (Newman and 
Clarke 2009); that a matter of common interest unites a population of individuals. The ‘issue 
public’ (Converse 2006), for example, captures the way that some people follow a [political] 
issue more closely than others and, in doing so, exert pressure on policymakers to take certain 
decisions (Hestres 2014). The broader hypothesis around issue publics is that different issues 
that in totality make up the political world, engage the particular interests of people. Each issue 
public has the knowledge required to engage with the politics of their particular domain, even 
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though they may lack knowledge of other political areas (Henderson 2014). The ‘public’, thus 
differentiated into mutually exclusive sub-sets, exists in an abstract sense.  
Beyond what constitutes a public, the notion has different meanings depending on the context 
in which it is deployed (Hainz et al. 2017). The term is normative in that it helps shape inclusive 
social identities. For an individual to remain ‘outside’ of a public, which they may otherwise 
be identified with, can be interpreted as subversive (Laurenson and Collins 2006). It is often 
the case that publics who unites and respond in an active way are a fraction of the broader, 
equally affected yet inactive masses. This hidden yet virtual public, perceived by policymakers 
as disenfranchised and disengaged, is a focal point for the democratic process. Actualising and 
enfranchising this public, by extending participation and consultation throughout the policy 
process, is one way of ‘assuaging mistrust’ with regard, for example, the inception of new 
technologies (Lezaun and Soneryd 2007). For a public to exist, it must occupy a material and/or 
a virtual space, e.g. the ‘public sphere’ (Habermas 1991). Describing this space invariably 
involves committing to one ontological foundation or another (DeLanda 2006b). Hence, 
‘publics’ intersect with the regulation of spaces and places; transcending a mere ‘body of 
people’. The political frame around a public is necessarily ontological, with the act of 
governance conferring one type of subjectivity over another.  
Having acknowledged that publics are composed of different types of actor, the next logical 
step is to explore the reality status of these actors and their interrelations, because the political 
process builds claims around, and plays a role in, how the world is represented and our 
interpellation into it. 
Ontological politics or the politics of ontology?  
The ontological confusion around the reality status of the ‘public’ affords a practical resource 
for politicians, facilitating the ability to draw on contrasting discourses to effect rhetorical work 
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(Laclau 2005). The government has the power to make issues appear routinised, naturalised 
and hence apolitical (Latour 2007), in that they ‘enter public arenas in [a] process of 
`disambiguation’, pulling apart from other issues, become legitimised as a topic of concern, 
and then established as part of routine coverage, maintained through institutionalised 
mechanisms’ (Pakulski et al. 1998, p. 240). I.e. the status of a public concern changes 
politically and ideologically as it diffuses and transforms via different actors and practices. 
Thus, it is reasonable to reflect on concern not as an unchanging and static object but as a 
process, that, certainly in the sense of worry and anxiety, implies a future-looking orientation. 
As such, we are dealing with a virtual object yet to unfold: ‘its location and ultimate extent are 
undefined. Its nature is open-ended’ (Massumi 2010). Thinking about public concern as a 
process with past, present and future extensions foreshadows the need to interrogate the 
concept’s temporal dimensions.  
Public concern is often reported in relation to key events, such as the emergence of ash dieback 
disease in the UK in 2012; considered by some commentators as the event responsible for 
effecting a shift around UK tree health policy (Heuch 2014). Ontologically, dieback appears as 
an ‘event’ that triggers action, and yet, as an object in itself, exists in an abstract sense. Where 
do we look for this object? What is its spatiotemporal setting? Where do we envisage the 
‘event’ beginning and ending? The answers to such questions reveal our political and 
ontological commitments to the world. Whilst it makes common sense to talk about dieback as 
an event, common sense results in vague or inconsistent knowledge (Berto and Plebani 2015), 
setting the stage for conflicted and contrasting claims about what the event means and how to 
manage it, as was the case with dieback (Fellenor et al. under review-a). 
Consideration of the status of the objects comprising an ‘event’ illustrates the complexity of 
the issue. For example, a natural flood exists as a material event that occurs irrespective of 
whether people assign meaning to it or not (Weichhart and Höferl 2013). The instant the event 
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is categorised, an ensemble of discourses are drawn upon to make a now ‘risky’ event 
meaningful. An individual or community in close spatial proximity to the flood will assign 
different meanings compared to those removed. Representation of the flood in the media will 
select and frame some aspects over others, e.g. actual effects such as loss of life, and property 
damage, but also virtual effects in relation to future occurrences. The flood manifests as an 
event composed of virtual and actual objects that traverse spatial and temporal scales. Those 
concretely affected may receive aid. Aid reflects policy. The entanglement of these objects and 
dimensions is a virtuality that, as it morphs into an actual state, transforms the actual state 
already in existence (Grint 2005). Meaning is constantly constructed and reconstructed, 
pointing to events as an ongoing process and this implies that the potential of a situation always 
exceeds its actuality (Massumi 1998). The event is emergent in the sense that it cannot be 
reduced to actual antecedents alone, meaning that attempts to construct an absolute version of 
the event is redundant. Public concern is similarly indeterminate. Thus, the issue of ontology 
becomes a critical element in understanding the policy response to a risk event (Hay 2006). If 
policy adopts an ‘atomistic’ ontology, whereby individual needs and motivations are 
differentiated from any social influence (Fay 1996), the social cannot be prioritised in 
formulating solutions to the event. In reality, the political process tends to ontological 
structuralism, which eschews prioritising individual needs and concerns (Hay 2006). As a 
rhetorical device and a driver for policy, public concern relies on a representation where, 
despite the multitude of individual differences, difference is effaced. The assumption is that 
‘there is an ultimate, given unity behind appearance to which all [differences] reduce’ (Catlaw 
2007, p. 2). In our flood example, attributing public concern requires sufficient and shared 
conditions cutting across different publics. However, the flood as ‘event’ is heterogeneous with 
respect to the various actors involved. Hence, ‘concern’ will be equally heterogeneous. This 
ushers in a further point of reflection, given that policy responses tend to rely on 
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macroreductionist strategies (DeLanda 2006a), concerning the relation between 
social/individual and private/public.  
How does ‘private’ become ‘public’, and vice versa? 
If public concern entails the relationship between social and individual then it also entails 
exploring how concern is ‘felt’ as private, inner experiences and their relation to the public 
realm. When public concern appears in the media, it is attached to an environmental issue, food 
contamination and so forth. The particular framing of concern may be in the form of worry as 
being justified, or as irrational/misplaced. Engagement with such media may reprise an 
individual’s existing concern, it may trigger a new concern or it may not be identified with it 
all. For example, in terms of environmental public concern, environmental publics comprise 
different political, economic and sociocultural groupings. Publics sensitive to green issues tend 
to closely monitor environmental marketing practices and exercise influence toward making 
firms' marketing actions environmentally responsible (Leonidou et al. 2010). Public concern is 
perceived as a driver for the general organisation of activity and can be thought of as an already 
existing state on the public side of the public/private dichotomy.  
In response to encountering a concern issue, people often experience an affective2, visceral 
response rooted in ‘hunches’ rather than verifiable facts. This has been addressed in the risk 
literature, for example, in relation to the role of affect (Lupton 2012; Slovic et al. 2007). The 
affective response connects to how people call on particular experiences to make sense of social 
objects of concern. These experiences may not reflect rational discourses about what concern 
entails. For example, when discussing what constitutes concern with regard to the prospect of 
proposed affordable housing in existing communities, people often articulate personal 
experiences that have evoked a visceral response (Rai 2016). A woman at a public meeting 
                                                          
2 Affect is ignored in many models addressing risk, or viewed as mere epiphenomena of the [cognitive] decision 
making process (Leiserowitz 2006). 
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about a proposed housing development stating that ‘she “wants to go jogging in her 
neighbourhood” without feeling as if she “is going to be raped” (ibid. p. 174).  
Particular, private and affective experiences help ‘collectivise and […] galvanise consequential 
[publics and their concerns]’ (ibid). Experiences become re-presented as indicative of a general 
public concern that is not contingent on private experiences and reflects a composite of issues 
beyond the ‘core’ problem. The entanglement between everyday experiences and the rhetoric 
of politics in terms of ‘ordinary affect’ provides a means of exploring and articulating the way 
that the ordinary connects with the extraordinary (Stewart 2007). ‘Ordinary affects are public 
feelings that begin and end in broad circulation, but they’re also the stuff that seemingly 
intimate lives are made of’ (ibid. p.2). This echoes the way in which actualised states of affairs 
are constantly transformed and reconstituted by the virtual. In the housing development 
example: imagined scenarios of what might be actualised. This is at the root of the metaphysical 
attempt to unite individual striving with a sense of community (Rorty 1989), i.e. that there is a 
‘common’ or public aspect of human nature. The sceptical view is that at there is no essential 
human solidarity; that the sense of such is an artefact of human socialisation. From this 
perspective, there is no public and concerns are inevitably individual. Hence the need to self-
consciously unpack the ontological issues. 
Public concern from an empirical perspective 
It is useful to reflect on empirical research to understand how public concern is ‘measured’. 
Public concern has been assessed by methodologies where a) it is elicited and, b), those which 
recourse to ‘naturally occurring’ data, i.e. non-elicited.  
The first approach includes polls, surveys, and solicited written input. Polls and surveys involve 
methodological issues including whether measures encourage socially desirable responses. For 
example, a Likert-type measure such as “I am concerned about the risks from issue ‘X’” may 
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lead the respondent to assume they should be concerned, and implies that there is a risk attached 
to issue ‘X’. We cannot be certain about the extent to which a response reflects pre-existing 
concern, or whether concern was created in situ. How people respond to questions about issues 
is influenced by what they have ‘heard lately’, e.g. via the media. In this sense, concern 
obviously entails temporal variation (McLaren et al. 2017). Moreover, an assumption is that 
peoples’ attitudes are explicitly and consciously available for reflection, when in fact they may 
be implicit and contextualised (Oskamp and Schultz 2014). With polls comes the assumption 
that public concern about an issue correlates with the proportion of people responding to it as 
such. However, if separate issues were presented as their own questionnaire, then any issue 
would result in the majority apparently concerned with it (Funkhouser 2016).  
In exemplifying specific studies, the relationship between expert assessments of two hazards, 
smoke haze and dengue fever, and the role of social media compared to traditional media in 
risk amplification was explored (Ng et al. 2017). Public concern is not considered as a construct 
that is explicitly operationalised as a thing in itself. Instead, concern is conflated with 
‘attention’ and ‘reaction’.  Risk perception is framed in terms of cognitive and affective 
elements and related to behavioural outcomes such as information seeking. Positing affect as a 
cognitive by-product is problematic in that its non-representational stance overlooks ‘the 
political fact of different bodies having different affective capacities’ (Tolia‐ Kelly 2006, p. 
213). Eschewing a political ontology of affect ‘risk[s] negating the “political facts” of power 
[…] as factors in an individual's capacity to affect and be affected’ (Griffiths 2017, p. 620). In 
relation to SARF, we suggest that a minimum requirement is that it makes explicit its political 
ontology.  
That public concern is assumed to exist, in an á priori sense, is exemplified by the disparity 
between public views and expert opinion regarding remedying oil spills (Leschine 2002). This 
disparity is frequently identified as a consequence of skewed public concern resulting from a 
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biased media. Events such as the Torrey Canyon catastrophe laid the ground for ‘a new type of 
man-made spectacle: the environmental disaster’ (ibid. p. 63). The implication is that events 
sharing similar properties form a risk trope that frames subsequent events. In actuality, 
significant variation exists in the contexts around different events. If events of an assumed type 
demonstrate variability, in what ways can we claim public concern with respect to ash dieback 
disease, for example, is similar to concern about E.coli? There may be a common semblance 
of concern but each public and hence their concerns are particular. Moreover, how the media 
and policymakers respond to events intersects with responses from activist groups in a way that 
ultimately curtails the types of response options open to those dealing with event consequences. 
Hence, public attitudes towards an issue becomes an element of ‘concern’ recursively shaped 
by actions taken to remedy and mitigate risks in the first place. 
With the approaches discussed thus far, public concern is assumed á priori, but explored 
retrospectively. Establishing concern in this way is implicit in the majority of work that utilises 
non-elicited ‘naturally occurring’ data. Social media in particular facilitates this analytic 
approach. Signorini et al. (2011) explored public concerns regarding H1N1[‘swine flu’] 
activity, assessing a large corpus of tweets using pre-specified key words reflecting illness-like 
symptoms, social context, transmission routes and countermeasures. The premise was that 
public concern about H1N1 is reflected in the volume of Twitter talk about topics that correlate 
with it, such as hand-hygiene and the use of facemasks. I.e. an equivalence between volume of 
talk and concern. Making no ontological distinction between talk about an issue and the broader 
reality status of the issue3 overlooks the ‘huge invisible ontology’ from which speech emerges 
                                                          
3 We suggest that the status of material objects in relation to language remains fuzzy from a discourse 
perspective, unless, of course, a specific ontology is adopted.   
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(Searle 1995). I.e. those institutional forces, functions, events and acts, alongside the realm of 
‘brute material reality’ and in which they are necessarily grounded.  
Fellenor et al. (under review-b) afford a more critical eye on what constitutes public concern 
that acknowledges some of the aforementioned issues. Their study explored the content and 
daily volume of emails and phones calls from the general public reporting potential sightings 
of ash dieback disease (H. fraxineus), to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (Defra) and Forest Research (FR), during the height of media attention to dieback in 
the UK in late 2012. Public concern was not assumed á priori. Email content was assessed for 
uses of negative affect language, with the hypothesis that concern might manifest as such. The 
low level of emails found using negative affect language problematises any claims that concern 
about dieback was high. In terms of the assumption that public concern equates with public 
attention, or volume of talk around a topic, findings suggest that whilst these equivalences may 
hold at a macro level, they largely disappear at the micro level of the individual; reasons for 
emailing were varied. The results also challenge the notion that media attention can be taken 
as a proxy of public concern, evidenced by the low representation in emails of media references 
and lack of media framings of dieback.  
In relation to SARF per se,  (Fellenor et al. 2017) carried out an empirical analysis of how ash 
dieback disease was talked about on Twitter by analysing ‘what’ people were saying, ‘who’ 
people were and ‘how’ the talk was accomplished. This study did not assume public concern 
as an á priori object. What people talked about largely reflected the themes and trajectory of 
traditional media representations of dieback, e.g. that that the government were to blame. The 
‘who’ revealed small groups of users with group affiliations, interests and identities, rather than 
a broad and ‘general’ public. This finding is crucial because it moves ‘beyond working with a 
generalised and often decontextualised notion of the public and their concerns’ (ibid. p.14). 
Individual tweets reflected a complexity that does not simplistically reflect the 
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characterisations of intensified or attenuated concern attributed to the ‘concerned public’ 
espoused by SARF. Moreover, the SARF tenet that risk amplification, or attenuation, can result 
from a disparity between lay and expert understandings of risk is problematised in that Twitter 
mixes ‘expert’ voices with other more or less expert [lay] users and points, at least at the 
discursive level, to the heterogeneity of the public and their concerns. 
Both of these latter studies adopt a micro-level analytic focus to reveal the heterogeneity and 
different routes to what is otherwise denoted as [macro] public concern. Nonetheless, drawing 
down to the micro level, as a means of uncovering the issues associated with the representation 
of concern is not a solution. It merely serves as one way of highlighting the issue of 
representation (Catlaw 2007). 
Methodological choices are invariably founded on specific ontologies. Keeping an eye on the 
ontological, while reflecting on the methodological, is instructive. Bausewein et al. (2013) 
employed a telephone survey to assess levels of public concern with regard to different 
symptoms and problems in advanced cancer care, finding that the main concerns for the last 
year of life are pain, being a burden, and breathlessness. The authors state that ‘public views 
are reflected in each person diagnosed with cancer’ (ibid. p.10). This statement presents us with 
the problem of ascertaining the ontological relation between individual and public, or private 
and public, given the implicit assumption that individual concerns can simply be aggregated, 
making the social the product of all individuals. This is a macroreductionist approach; 
problematic because each individual experience is reduced to an abstract supervenient entity 
(DeLanda 2017). What is lost is the particularity of individual experience (Fellenor 2015). If 
an alternative view were adopted, perhaps that there are social representations that circulate 
independently of individuals and that these affect the way in which individuals perceive their 
cancer, we would still need to account for these representations. With regard policy, these 
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issues converge in the problem that the unit of observation (the individual) does not correspond 
to the unit at which decisions are made (the social) (Getzen 2000). 
The key point to take away with regard to how public concern is measured empirically is that, 
methodologically, too much is taken as read or left unexamined. In the following section, we 
briefly unpack how this critique applies to SARF. 
Public concern through an ontological lens 
Public concern and SARF: the amplification of what?  
The ways in which SARF has been deployed suggests it is amenable to various ontological 
perspectives. SARF recognises risk as entangled with a range of ideal (e.g. cognitive, social, 
and cultural) and material objects, in doing so implicitly affording risk an ontological realism 
(Rosa 2003). In terms of ‘traditional’ risk characterisation, i.e. probability and harm, SARF 
tends to neglect equity issues in relation to the differences between social groups (Kasperson 
et al. 1988). Certain realities can become prioritised over others. Moreover, SARF is predicated 
on a synthesis of ontologically incompatible concepts and theoretical frameworks (Duckett and 
Busby 2013). If risk reflects something real and ‘out there’ in the world, then a realist ontology 
is implied, lending itself to corresponding realist epistemologies. Ultimately, SARF adopts an 
epistemological perspective and seeks a general explanation of how the risk world is 
represented, but this does not necessarily entail explication of its ontology. In contrast, an 
ontological perspective would explore the ways by which risk as a multiplicitous object comes 
into being, emphasising relations of difference that cannot be reduced to a ‘disparity in 
worldviews (Woolgar and Lezaun 2013).  
While SARF acknowledges that social amplification stations are themselves comprised of 
individuals, individual and social remain conflated; an early critique of SARF being that it 
prioritises individual over social interpretive processes (Bakir 2005). The conflation of 
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individual and public is exacerbated by a lack of clarity with regard the status of ‘what’ passes 
through such stations. For example, according to Kasperson et al. (2003) a priority for social 
amplification research is to understand the ‘mutation’ of trust, i.e. how trust interacts with risk 
communication and policy. While these authors acknowledge ‘amplification dynamics’, trust 
is afforded an objective status in that it can be ‘shaped, altered, lost or rebuilt in the processing 
of risk by social and individual stations’ (ibid. p.33). Trust is deconstructed in terms of 
attributes grounded in the individual, and which represent further levels of abstraction, e.g. that 
‘trust’ can be explained in terms of ‘faith’ (Renn and Levine 1991) or ‘values’ (Siegrist and 
Cvetkovich 2000). Even when regarded in purely psychological terms, trust is confused with 
other states, e.g. ‘hope’, in a way that overlooks the social complexity of the phenomena 
(Kasperson et al. 1992). We suggest that it is more useful to frame amplification stations not 
in terms of what passes through them, but instead how they act as a nexus composed of various 
types of actual and virtual objects. However, this is not an ontological solution. It merely 
necessitates exploring the issues of identity and difference, in relation to amplification stations, 
from a particular and not general perspective (Lynch 2013) and this demands a complementary 
ontology.  
If SARF lends itself to an ontological perspective then this perspective is typically taken as 
social constructionist because of the belief that trust, affect and so forth can be ideal and 
universal (Law and Lien 2013). What this perspective struggles to account for is not so much 
the ontological realism of risk, but rather the representational status of the different types of 
objects which risk involves and around which public concern develops.  
Does an ontological lens help clarify the issues around risk and public concern? 
To summarise the issues: 
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 The notion of ‘public concern’ plays a key role in the policy development and is a 
recurring element in the narratives we produce to make sense of the world.  
 Concern is one way in which individuals locate themselves, and are located, within a 
risk frame. This acts to constitute [a] public. 
 Despite its ubiquity, the ontological status of public concern remains uncharacterised, 
reflecting its uncritical deployment within the policy process and, from the 
methodological perspective, the tendency to assume it á priori. 
 To understand public concern we need to reflect on the relations between private and 
public and individual and social; an ontological endeavour. 
Two important features of public concern which we have made explicit through our discussion 
is that public concern represents either the macro or micro-reduction of individual/social, and 
private/public, where the contingent and dynamic relations between virtual and actual objects 
are reified as a matter of fact. Does adopting a non-reductionist ontological perspective help? 
The question of the nature of mutual relations between individual and social determines the 
kinds of entities whose existence one is committed to believe (DeLanda 2006a). Establishing 
a solution to this question, by prioritising either macro or microreductionist strategies, remains 
intractable. A third way, emerging over recent decades, addresses a growing concern with 
heterogeneity, indeterminacy, complexity, fluidity and the relations between material, 
immaterial, virtual and actual entities (Venn 2006). The ‘assemblage’ (DeLanda 2006a; 
Deleuze and Guattari 2005) collapses the notions of individual and social, in doing so 
inscribing a solution where every actor and its associations has its own distinct reality and 
setting (Callon 1984; 1986). This is appealing because it mirrors how we increasingly 
experience the world, and resonates with the recognition within the life sciences especially, 
that the nature of living systems is ‘undecidable’; i.e. they are not amenable to the causal and 
deterministic epistemologies applied to the natural sciences (Nadin 2017). To maintain the 
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illusion of public concern as a measurable, objective, predictable, and stable entity, the 
‘knowing subject’ has to be done away with.  
With regard to risk management, this appeal is articulated in terms of ‘riskscapes’ where ‘’risk’ 
can be considered as specific assemblages of heterogeneous entities as well as a proliferation 
of ‘hybrids’ and a ‘space of flow’ (Neisser 2014, p. 98). The standard rejoinder is that risk 
management needs to address the complexity associated with the assembled, heterogeneous 
nature of risks and to comprehend the interrelation of risk’s material, social and discursive 
aspects. The turn to complexity is itself pervasive. However, the nature of complexity means 
that while it has become part of the lexicon of risk, the reality of complexity is that one can 
only go so far in mitigating against its more deleterious aspects (Houchin and MacLean 2005). 
‘Complexity’ appears to have merely become part of the rhetoric around risk. The reality is 
that addressing one risk leads to the creation of another, given that our actions have material 
and social effects that can never be fully anticipated (Busby 2016).  
The ontology called upon in these perspectives is relational in nature (Slife 2004), affording 
primacy to process and change rather than substance and fixity. In this view, all things, 
including people and their practices, are mutually constitutive. The difficulty for a relational 
ontological approach to public concern and risk is that beyond the question of what constitutes 
a ‘relation’, risks are usually couched with respect to a material object or event that hinges 
around such objects. Hence, when we talk about risk and when public concern emerges, there 
is a tendency to conflate substance with process. The caveat of adopting a relational ontology 
is that we have to assume that people and things are intimately connected in ways that remain 
unnoticed or unacknowledged (Wildman 2010) and this can result in making macroreductionist 
misassumptions about public concern. 
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One of the founding questions of SARF was why seemingly minor risk events often resulted 
in disproportionate public concern. From the relational ontological perspective, this may not 
be so surprising. If every risk event has its own distinct reality and setting, and if ‘people's 
actions are always locally defined and emergent’ (Missonier and Loufrani-Fedida 2014, p. 
1110), viewing the social amplification of risk through an ontological lens means that 
discrepancies in perspective are to be expected. Rather than seeking to eradicate them, it may 
be more productive to avoid establishing public concern as the ‘MacGuffin’ around which risk 
assessment and policy issues constellate.   
Conclusion 
The broad purpose of this paper was to reflect on the problematic nature of public concern and 
its relation to risk, and to consider whether an ontological perspective might help clarify this 
issue. By exploring how publics have been conceptualised, and framing this with an ontological 
perspective, we have begun to de-black-box concern.  
We suggested that the notion of public concern is a ubiquitous object that enables the 
justification of policy decision by policymakers and is fully naturalised into the narratives 
people produce to make sense of the world. While public concern is pivotal in the risk literature 
and the media, the concept remains black-boxed, i.e. it tends to be presented in an 
unproblematic manner and as an homogenous object. Doing so neglects the variable aspects of 
concern, such as which specific groups of individuals are affected by an issue, how these affects 
are experienced and so forth. Thus, it can be suggested that attributing public concern confers 
a general subjectivity on otherwise disparate groups of indiviudals in distinct settings and, as 
such, acts in a regulatory manner. Moreover, if failing to acknowledge the ontology of public 
concern is to risk effacing the multitude of individual differences that constitute and shape how 
a [risk] issue is experienced, then it is also to risk developing abstract policies.  
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Given the intrinsic relations between risk events and concern, we suggested that greater 
attention needs to be paid to how the latter concept, the ‘event’, is theorised. As with public 
concern, ‘events’ are similarly constituted at a rhetorical and discursive level, and talked about 
in an unproblematic, common-sense manner. Hence, our critique of public concern also applies 
to events: common sense understandings result in vague, inconsistent knowledge and sets the 
stage for contrasting ideas with regard how concern and risk events should be managed and 
inadequate policies.    
We argued that concern is predicated on the unresolved dichotomies of individual/private and 
private/public. The majority of empirical work into public concern and risk issues tends to 
assume public concern in an á priori manner. We contrasted this work with studies which 
sought to avoid assuming concern in an á priori sense and which adopt a micro-perspective, to 
suggest that public concern is heterogeneous and particular. There are several issues here.  
Firstly, researchers and policymakers need to reflect on what constitutes a valid indicator of 
public concern. Secondly, identifying such indicators requires the ontological unpacking of 
concern, that we have discussed. Thirdly, and assuming that concern has been unpacked and 
indicators identified, greater attention should be paid to the methdologies employed to ‘capture’ 
concern. Finally, this connects back to the issue of where and how concern is ‘experienced’, 
i.e in terms of the relations between its affective, cognitive, private and public aspects.  
Via our ontological lens, we also highlighted how the individual/private dichotomy appears to 
characterise some of the issues levelled, for example, at SARF. If characterising public concern 
is problematic, then can we adequately account for something labelled as ‘the social 
amplification of risk’? Does the ‘ripple’ metaphor of SARF continue to apply, unless of course 
we avoid thinking about it ontologically? Or is it the case that a new metaphor for SARF is 
required? These are issues that require further thought. 
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Finally, having highlighted the problems with micro and macro reductionist ontologies, we 
discussed how a burgeoning understanding of risk framed with complexity has converged with 
‘assemblage’ thinking. We suggested that this results in similar issues to macro and 
microreductionist ontologies. Thus, while a non-reductionist ontology holds intuitive appeal, 
one that complements evolving understandings of complexity, risk and concern, it takes us no 
further forward to managing the contingencies of risk. Nonetheless, thinking about public 
concern through an ontological lens has helped us trace its contours and de-black-boxed some 
of the problems and hopefully paved the way for further exploration from this perspective. 
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